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On Cooperative Games Connected 
with Markets 
MILAN MARES 
The presented paper deals with the model of cooperative equilibrium in markets with trans-
ferable utility, as suggested in [8] and [7]. It presents some ideas concerning the connection 
between such markets and cooperative games with transferable itulity. Namely, it suggests a way 
of construction of such games which maximally reflect the properties of given market and its 
cooperative equilibria. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper is a free continuation of [7] and, especially, [8]. It presents some 
further properties of the ^-equilibrium defined there. The motivation of that equi-
librium definition was explained in [8]. Here we are interested in the connection 
between equilibria and some game-theoretical solutions. These connections were 
already investigated and interesting results were obtained. They are introduced 
in [4], [6] and also in [8]. These results, usually, show that the equilibria are stronger 
than the game theoretical solutions in the sense that the existence of equilibrium 
implies the existence of some game-theoretical solution. The opposite implication 
may be obtained for the ^//-equilibrium under very special assumptions. The main 
goal of this work is to suggest a new definition of game connected with market, 
which would better reflect the properties of market. Solution of such game, namely 
its core, could be more close to cooperative market equilibrium. Hence, the well-
known game theoretical results could be better applicable into market theory. 
2. FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS AND RESULTS 
In this section we repeat the basic definitions and the main auxiliary results, intro-
duced and discussed in [8] already. 
452 If mis a positive integer number then R,R + ,R
m and Rm are the sets of real numbers, 
non-negative real numbers, real-valued m-dimensional vectors and of those vectors 
with non-negative coordinates, respectively. If Jl is a class of sets then we denote 
(1) (JO ={KeJ/:if & c Ji, Ji? is a partition of K then JS? = {K}} . 
A cooperative market is a quadruple 
m = ( / , R x R:,(Uf)fe/,(a')feJ), 
where / is the set of all players, vectors x = (x0, xu . . . , xm), x0 e R, (xu ..., xm) e 
e R+ represent x0 units of money and xu x2, ..., xm units or regular goods; vectors 
a' e R x Rm are the initial quantities of money and goods owned by players, and 
Ui : R+ -* R, i el, are the utilities of real goods for players. 
We denote, further, the class J f of all non-empty subsets of I, which are caled 
coalitions, and the mappings w; : R x R
m -> R, i el, such that 
ut(x0, xu ...,xm) = x0 + Ut(xu ...,xm), 
which are called utility functions of players. All goods in the market, even money, 
have their prices. We denote them by p = (p0, pu ..., pm) e R
m + 1, where pj > 0, 
j = 0,1, .. ,,m, and the set of admissible price-vectors is denoted by P. We suppose, 
moreover that vectors p e P and x e R x Rm are such that the scalar product px 
has sense. We denote 
X = {X = (xi)ieI:x
ieR x R"l, iel} , 
XK = { j r e X : T V : g Y V } , KeJf, 
ieK ieK 
AK(p) = {XeX:£pX
i^YP«i}> KeJT, peP. 
ieK ieK 
The following statements were proved in [8] as Lemmas 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively. 
Statement A. Let Ke X,peP. Then there exist the maxima 
max { X ulx') : X = (x')ieI e XK} and max { £ «,(*'') : X = (*%, E .4K(p)} . 
ieK ieK 
Statement B. If p e P, K e Jf, / q JT, if / is a partition of R: then for all Z = 
= (x'),e/ e AK(p) is 
(2) I K.(V) S I max { J u ^ 1 ) : Y = ( / ) , , , e A7(p)} . 
ieK Jef ieJ 
Statement C. Let p £ P, Ji <= jf, (Ji~y be a partition of / . Let X e A}(p) for all 
J e (Jiy. Then Xe AK(p) for all R: e M. 
Statement D. Let p e P, Jl <=. jf, <,///> be a partition of 7, and let X = (*%/ 6 X. 453 
If 
I «.(*<) = max { X « . ( / ) : F = (y%, e Aj(p)} 
ieJ ie / 
for all J e (J/} then also 
I "i(*0 = max { X ".(.vO : F = (j'Ofer 6 AK(p)} 
for all K e Jt. 
Any pair (X, p), Xe X, p e P is called a market state. If./// c j f then the market 
state (X, p) is called an Ji-eqiiilibrium \£XeXj, and for any K e J/ is Xe AK(p) and 
£ «;(V) = max { £ «,.(/) : Y = ( / ) t e / e AK(p)} . 
ieK ieK 
If we denote by . / the class of all one-element coalitions in 3C, i.e. 
(3) • = mu 
then the classical equilibrium, defined e.g., in [4] is identical with ./-equilibrum 
in our terminology, and the following statement, proved in [8] as Theorem 2, is 
true. 
Statement E. Let Ji ez X, X e X, p e P. If (X, p) is an ./-equilibrium then it is 
also an ^-equilibrium. 
3. GAME CONNECTED WITH A MARKET 
The basic situation in cooperative market and in cooperative game is analogous 
in the sense that players form their coalitions, correlate their behaviour and distribute 
the final profit. These analogies may be expressed even in exact form. This section 
presents two of such expressions — the classical one, and a new one which is in some 
cases more adequate to the real relations between games and markets. 
Statement A (i.e. Lemma 1 from [8]) enables us to define the mapping » : Jf -» R 
in the following way 
(4) v(K) = max { £ «,•(*'') : X = (* V 6 * * } > K e * > 
]eK 
which has the following property proved in [8] in Lemma 5. 
Statement F. The mapping v defined by (4) is superadditive, i.e. 
v(K u L) = v(K) + v(L) for any K, Le .XT ,. K n L = 0 . 
454 We accept here the game-theoretical terminology, and we call an imputation 
any real-valued vector £ = (£%. , £* e R, such that there exists AT = (x ' ) f e /e X 
for which <f = w,(x'), i e L Further, we introduce the following auxiliary symbols: 
2 = {£ = ({«)„ : 3(A- = ( x % , e X) V (i e l ) , «;(x
f) = £'} , 
2 X = {£ e 3 : 3(X = ( x % , e XK) V(i 6 / ) , M;(x') = {'} . 
Then the ordered pair Em = (Z, i>) is called a coalition-game connected with market 
m = (/, R x R™, (U;),-eJ, («%/)> and mapping t> is called its characteristic function. 
Lemma 1. Let £ = (£ ' )« , £' e R. Then 
{-Sr*I{'S«(/). 
is/ 
Proof . Let £ e ST. Then there exists AT = (x') ; e i e X, such that £' = t/;(V). By (4) 
iel iel V y 
On the other hand, let 
»(I) = Ec1'. 
iel 
Then there exists, according to Statement A, Y = ( y y £ ^ . . 
Let us construct X = (x')isI e X such that 
x0 = y'0 + V - « . ( / ) , i e / , 
XJ = yj> i e / , , •_ . 
Then AT e X / ; as 
I 4 = I Уo + E Čł - v(l) < v ; 
Z*}-lyh i - i „, 
i s l fej ' " * , 
and F e X ; . Moreover, for,any i 6 1 is 
M;(x'') = xj, + U;(x'i, . . ; , x i ) a j 
^,w...,ni) = { , ^ "
i ( y ) + 
so that £ e 2,. 
Now, we may formulate the following definition of a game-theoretical solution. 
We say that vector £ = (£f)ieI is Jl-stable in game Tm, where Jl <= Jf, if 
£eEj and £ £} = v(K) for all KeJi . 
ieK 
According to Lemma 1, £ is ̂ -s table iff 
£ <f ^ v(l) and X ^ = V(K) > for a11 *- e •* • 
The reasons for presenting the game-theoretical solution in such form were discussed 
in [8]. Here we note, only, that the ^-stability is a generalization of the concept 
of core, as any £ e 3 is ,;f-stable iff it is an element of core in game Tm. 
There are some interesting results concerning mutual connections between equi-
librium and core, given in literature. Their analogies, formulated in terms of our 
cooperative market model and game model, were proved in [8], in Theorem 3 and 
Corollary 4. It simplifies the further references if we repeat here Theorem 3 from [8] 
as the following statement. 
Statement G. Let m be a market and let Fm be the coalition-game connected with 
m. Let i / c j f , I = (xl)isIeX, peP, £ = (£,
l)isIeS, and let £
l = u{x') for all 
i e J. lf(X, p) is an ^//-equilibrium then the imputation £, is .//-stable. 
Theorem 3 and Corollary 4 in [8] are formulated as implications, where the pro-
perty of ^-equilibrium or ./-equilibrium, according to (3), for (X, p) implies the 
..//-stability or ^-stability of £ e E where tf = ut(x'), i e /. The form of implication 
is essential for statements of this type. It may be substituted by equivalence only 
under very strong assumptions, as it was done in Theorem 5 in [8]. The main problem 
of the presented work is to find another definition of game connected with a market, 
which would better reflect the existing analogies, and which would enable us to 
formulate some analogical statements in stronger form with equivalence instead 
of implication. 
4. MARKET CHARACTERISTIC FUNCTION 
The topic of this section is to introduce a modified form of coalition-game connected 
with a market, and to prove the main results concerning mutual connections between 
.//-stability in such game and .^-equilibrium in the considered market. Statement A, 
i.e. Lemma 1 from [8], enables us to introduce the following mapping w : Jf x P -* 
-* R such that 
(5) w(K,p) = max{ V>,•(*''):* = (x%je AK(p)} , KeX,peP, 
IEK 
which we call a characteristic function of market m. 
456 Remark 1. For K e Jf, p e P is w(AT, p) ^ «(K) as XK c ^ (p ) . 
Remark 2. Let X e , f , p e ? , I = (x%7 e X, n AA-(p). Then (X, p) is a {^-equi-
librium iff 
Zui(x') = w(K,p), 
ieK 
and, according to Statement A, for any Ke Jf, pe P, there exists Xe X such that 
(X, p) is a {^-equilibrium. 
Mapping w(.,p) : Jf -» R for fixed p e P is not generally superadditive, so that 
it is not convenient for definition of a new coalition-game F = (/, w(.,p)) which 
could describe the cooperation in the considered market. Moreover, the following 
statement can be proved. 
Lemma 2. The mapping w(.,p) is subadditive for any p e P, i.e. 
w(L,p) + w(M,p)^ w(Lu M,p), L,MeJC, LnM = 0. 
Proof. Lemma follows immediately from Stetement B, i.e. from Lemma 2, [8]; 
if we put K = Lu M and # = {L,M}. Then (2) represents the desired inequality. 
Lemma 3. Let X = (xl)ieI e X,, p e P, Ji <= X , let Ji be a partition of I, and let 
X «;(*') ^ H>(K, />) for all K e ^ . 
ieA' 
Then X e AK(p) for all K e ^//. 
Proof. Let us suppose that there exists Le Ji such that Xf AL(p), i.e. 
(6) ! > * ' > Z/"*•''' 
ieL ieL 
A s l e X / ; the inequality 
Z /'•*' = Z /"*' 
is/ ieJ 
holds, and there exists J e Ji such that 
Z />*' < Z /"*' • 
ieJ ieJ 
Let us construct Y = (y')iei e X such that 
>'o = x'0 + (p«'' - /»x')/p0 , 
y'i = x'j, j = I, . . . , m , i e J . 
This Y belongs to Aj(p), as 
E PУ' = !>«'> 
and 
X «,</) = 5; Hi(x0 + i- ( 2 > ' - »*') > x «.(*') = Hf />), 
ie./ ieJ P 0 feJ iei it./ 
which is a contradiction with (5). Consequently, (6) can not be true for any Le Jt 
and X eAK(/») for all KeJt. 
Remark 3. If Jt c JT and <«#> is defined by (l) then there is no set of coalitions 
Ku...,Kte iJty, such that Kr n Ks m 0,r # s, r,s = 1 , . . . , t,K± u . . . u Kte(Jty. 
It means that any real-valued set function defined on <//> may be considered to be 
superadditive on <„#>. 
The last Remark implies that the triple Tm(p) = (/, <„//>, w(.,p)) forms a coali­
tion-game in usual sense, e.g. in the form used in [2] and in other papers. The set J 
is set of players, <„//> is the class of admissible coalitions and w(.,p), where p e P 
is fixed, is the characteristic function of the game rm(p). The core of that game is 
identical with the class of all <^//>-stable real-valued vectors £, = (<T);ei e S, where S 
is the set of imputations in the game fm(p). For the game defined in such way we can 
prove the following statement. 
Theorem 1. Let X = (x')imteXj, peP, Jt c X, let <.,//> be a partition of I, 
and let £, = (£,l)ieI e Sj be such that £'' — u^x
1) for i el. Then (X, p) is an ^//-equi-
librium if and only if £ is <^//>-stable in the game Fm(p), i.e. iff t is an element in the 
core of rm(p). 
Proof . If (X, p) is an ^-equilibrium then 
(7) Z?Zw(K,p) 
I E K 
for all K e Jt and, consequently, c, is <^#>-stable in Em(p), as <„//> c Jt. On the 
other hand, let (7) be true for all K e (Jty. Then, according to Lemma 3, Xe AK(p) 
for all K e < / /> . As X e Xj, (X, p) is an <^#>-equilibrium. Lemmas 3 and 4 from [8], 
i.e. Stetements C and D from Section 2, imply that it is also an .//-equilibrium. 
Corollary 1. Under assumptions of Theorem 1, if £ is <.//>-stable in game Em(p) 
then Q is .//-stable in rm, as follows from Theorem i and from Statement G, i.e. 
from Theorem 3 in [8]. 
458 Theorem 2. Let p e P, Ji c jf, and let <„#> be a partition of I. Then there 
exists l e X such that {X, p) is an ^//-equilibrium if and only if 
Z W{K,p) = w{l,p). 
Ke<Jt> 
Proof. If {X, p) is an ^-equilibrium then for all K e (J/} 
Z ^ H < K , p ) , 
ieK 
it means that 
Z^ = I Z ^ X MK,P) 
iel Ke<Jt> ieK Ke<Jl> 
and 
£ { ' ^ ( I ) | . P ( ^ ) , 
as I e Xj and Remark 1 holds. Consequently, according to Lemma 2, the desired 
equality holds. Let, now. 
(8) A!,P)< Z w{K,p), 
Ke < Jl > 
and let there exists Xe Xj,X = {x')ieI, such that 
£« .(*0-E^KK./0. 
iel ieK 
for all K e Ji, where £' = u'(V), i e l . Then 
££*£ Z <#,/»)> "(I,/') M I ) . 
fef Ke<Jl> 
according to Remark 1. It follows from Lemma 1 that this result contradicts to the 
assumption Xe Xj. So, {X, p) can not be an .^-equilibrium for any Xe X, if (8) is 
fulfilled. 
Corollary 2. Under the assumptions of Theorem 2,ifJ<= Ji, then J = <•//>, 
and there exists XeX such that (X, p) is an ^-equilibrium if and only if 
Z*<{o,p) = K/,p). 
Corollary 3. Let p e P, Jl c Jf, let ^f <= . # be a partition of /. If there exists 
.AT e X such that {X, p) is an ^/-equilibrium then 
ZЧь,p) = ЧI,/')-
Theorem 4. Let p e P, Ji c X and let <^#> be a partition of I. Then there 45S 
exists Xe X such that (X, p) is an ^-equilibrium if and only if the mapping w(.,p) 
is additive on the class of coalitions Jt u {/}. 
Proof. According to Theorem 3, it is sufficient to prove .hat 
(9) £ w(K,p) = w(I,p) 
Ke<J/> 
if and only if w(., p) is additive on the class Ji u {/}. According to the assumption 
that (Jty is a partition of I, Lemma 2 implies that for any K e Jl is 
I >4Lp)^ E W(J,p) + W(K,p)^H/,p), 
Je<Jl> Js<Jt> Jd-K 
and (9) implies that 
w(L,p)= £ H>(J,p) 
JE<JI> , J e t 
for all Le Ji. This equation means the additivity of >*>(•, p) on . # u {/}. On the other 
hand, if 
w(K, p) + w(L, p) = w(K u L, p) 
for all K, L,K\J Le Ji u {/} then also 
y > ( x , p ) = H<j,p) 
for all i£ cz Ji such that J? is a partition of/, and, consequently (9) holds. 
5. ADDITIVE CHARACTERISTIC FUNCTIONS 
The last statements of the previous section show the importance of additivity 
of w(-,p) for existence of equilibrium. Also Theorem 4 in [8] concerns the same 
subject and some other results dealing with that topic are introduced in this conclusive 
section of the presented paper. They all represent auxiliary tools for solving some 
special problems connected with the existence of ^-equilibria in cooperative markets. 
Lemma 4. If p e P then the mappings t>(.) and w(.,p) are equal on Jf if and only 
if they are equal on J'. In such a case both »(.) and w(.,p) are additive, i.e. 
v(K u L) = v(K) + v(L), w(K u L, p) = w(K, p) + w(L,p), 
K,LeJf,K^L=®. 
460 Proof . If »({/}) = w({i}, p) for all {/} e J then Lemma 5 from [8] (i.e. Statement 
F in Section 3) and Lemma 2 from Section 4 imply for any K e Jf 
w(K,p) £Y»>({i},p) = lv({i}) ^ v(K). 
ieK ieK 
On the other hand, AK(p) z> XK for any Ke.Jf, peP, so that w(K, p) = v(K), and 
the equation is proved. The opposite implication follows from / c . f immediately. 
As »(.) is superadditive and w(.,p) is subadditive, and as they are equal, they must 
be additive. 
Theorem 5. Let p e P, Jt c jf, let Jt be a partition of I, and let the mapping 
w(.,p) be additive. If there exists Xe X such that (X, p) is an ^-equilibrium then 
there exists Ye X such that (Y, p) is an ^-equilibrium for all ./V C jf . 
Proof. Let us consider X = ( i ' ) i £ , e X ; such that (X, p) is an ^//-equilibrium. 
It means that for all K e Jt is X e AK(p), and 
(10) Yui(x
i) = w(K,p). 
ieK 
The additivity of w(-,p) and relation (10) imply 
E ".-(**) = E w({i}> P) f o r a11 & e •# > 
ieK ieK 
and, as Jt is a partition of / , 
Zui(x') = lw({i},p). 
iel iel 
Let Y = (y')iEl e X, be such that for all / e / 
Vo = x'o + w({i},p) - " ; ( * % 
>»j - x j , j = 1, . . . , m . 
• * This Y is an element of X{, as 
Ey = E*! = E«;' 
is J iel iel 
and 
(11) M,<y) = w({i],p) for all / e / . 
According to Lemma 3, Ye A{n(p) for all / el. This fact, together with (11), implies 
that (Y, p) is an ./-equilibrium and, in accordance with Theorem 2 from [8] (i.e. 
Statement E in Section 2), (Y, p) is an A^-equilibrium for Jf <= ,yf. 
Theorem 6. If p e P, and if the mapping w(.,p) is additive then there always 
exists Xe X such that (X, p) is an ^-equilibrium for any Ji c jf. 
Proof . According to Remark 2 and according to definition of ^-equilibrium, 
there exists Ye X such that (Y, p) is an {/}-equilibrium. As {/} is also a partition 
of J, Theorem 5 may be applied. Consequently, there exists Xe X such that (X, p) 
is an ^-equilibrium for any Ji c Jf. 
Corollary 4. If p e P and if v({i}) = w({i}, p) for all i e / then there always exists 
XeX such that (X, p) is an „//-equlibrium for all Ji <= Jf. 
(Recived May 3, 1976.) 
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